Judicial Power and Church Autonomy

Branton J. Nestor*

The church autonomy doctrine limits judicial power. The doctrine provides important protections for religious institutions in our constitutional system. It protects the right of religious institutions to decide matters of church government, faith, and doctrine without improper interference from secular authorities. But while the doctrine has both deep historical roots and broad contemporary acceptance, there remain several challenging questions of exceptional importance that split courts and divide scholars. One question that has provoked significant debate is the relationship between church autonomy and judicial power. Does church autonomy limit the judicial power of civil courts to adjudicate suits implicating matters of church government, faith, and doctrine? And if so, what mandatory limits or prudential safeguards on the exercise of judicial power must or should be respected by civil courts? Given the Supreme Court’s commitment to interpreting the Religion Clauses by reference to historical practice, the origins and historical understanding of the doctrine are relevant to drawing the line between judicial power and church autonomy. But that history and its implications remain underdeveloped.

This Article suggests that the church autonomy doctrine, viewed in light of its history and tradition, imposes broad limits on the power of civil courts to exercise judicial review over matters of church government, faith, and doctrine reserved to ecclesiastical authorities. The church autonomy doctrine as it developed in historical practice limited the power of civil courts to exercise jurisdiction over or to inquire into ecclesiastical matters reserved to competent ecclesiastical authorities. Such limitations on judicial power over ecclesiastical matters were grounded in a trifecta of free exercise, nonestablishment, and voluntary-association principles—which preserved an important sphere of church autonomy. There were, to be sure, limits to the doctrine’s substantive protections and procedural safeguards—and even if civil courts agreed on broad church autonomy principles, they debated how to work out the line between church autonomy and judicial power in judicial practice—and the line between church authority and civil courts evolved and developed over time. But the main point, for present purposes, is to suggest that the church autonomy doctrine, as it settled in American judicial practice, generally limited the power of civil courts to exercise judicial power over matters of church government, faith, and doctrine—and these limitations both protected religious freedom from judicial interference and prevented judicial authorities from violating non-establishment principles. In doing so, the church autonomy doctrine entrenched important safeguards that limited the power of civil courts to trudge into matters of church government, faith, and doctrine—suggesting some important lessons for civil procedure and church autonomy today.

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© 2025 Branton J. Nestor. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.

*Fellow, Stanford Constitutional Law Center (2024–25). Thanks to Stephanie Barclay, Daniel Blomberg, Samuel Bray, Jud Campbell, Anthony Deardurff, Marc DeGirolami, Kellen Funk, Rick Garnett, Christopher Lund, Michael McConnell, James Phillips, Lee Otis, Owen Smitherman, Lael Weinberger, and Judges O’Scannlain and Richardson, as well as to participants at the Stanford Constitutional Law Center Works-In-Progress Workshop, Notre Dame Law & Religion Junior Faculty Conference, and Federalist Society Junior Scholars Colloquium. Thank you as well to the Volume 100 editors of the Notre Dame Law Review.