Commercial Anarchy: A Restatement

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Commercial Anarchy: A Restatement

Alan Schwartz* & Simone M. Sepe**

Our previous Article argued that three mandatory contract law rules—the rules prohibiting penalties and no renegotiation clauses, and authorizing courts not to obey party instructions regarding the evidence admissible to make an interpretation—should be reduced to defaults. We showed that these three rules—the “triad”—functioned unfairly because they bound only agents who lacked the contracting technology to avoid them; were inefficient because they raised the costs of or prevented parties from structuring particular deals, though the structures would not affect nonparties; and reduced party autonomy by restricting the ability of sophisticated parties to pursue their commercial goals through contract.

Professor Felipe Jiménez’s Reply accepts for purposes of argument our economic claim that the triad is inefficient and generally ineffective, and acknowledges that mandatory procedural rules reduce party autonomy or control. He argues, however, that these considerations do not establish the case for reform without a fuller account of distributive justice, autonomy, rights, and the state’s role in contract enforcement. For example, we showed that the triad rules violated Rawls’s difference principle because they bore most heavily on the least advantaged contractors. Jiménez responds that a complete Rawlsian analysis could uncover legal cases where doing justice would overcome the justice “loss” we expose.

This Response does two things: (i) We argue that, in the commercial area, reformers make out a prima facie case for reform by showing that existing rules are inefficient, autonomy reducing, and unfair. The justificatory burden should then shift to rule proponents. Jiménez instead argues that the welfare and autonomy case does not establish reform without a fuller account of the relevant political morality. We argue that placing this broader justificatory burden on reformers would unduly privilege the status quo and impede incremental legal reform. (ii) We also reframe the issue in terms of normative powers: Contract is a power-conferring practice, yet current law empowers parties to set primary obligations while disabling meaningful control over key incidents of enforcement and adjustment, producing unequal “normative opportunity.” We propose “deregulatory parity”—treating the triad rules as defaults—bounded by two limits, anti-realization and assent, and we sketch a model of robust private ordering (commercial anarchy) within those constraints.

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© 2026 Alan Schwartz & Simone M. Sepe. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.

* Sterling Professor Emeritus of Law and Professor of Management, Yale University. Email: alan.schwartz@yale.edu.

** Professor of Law and Finance and The Honourable Justice Frank Iacobucci Chair in Capital Markets Regulation, University of Toronto—Jackman Faculty of Law and Rotman School of Management; Center for the Philosophy of Freedom—University of Arizona; Yale Law School Center for Private Law; ECGI; American College of Governance Counsel. Email: simone.sepe@utoronto.ca.