Religious Majorities and Restrictions on Religion

Brett G. Scharffs*

What if dominant religious majorities are the most significant obstacle to religious freedom, and religious doctrine the most powerful force in eliminating that obstacle?

Social scientists studying freedom of religion and belief have focused upon two types of restrictions on religious freedom, formal restrictions that take the form of laws and other official legal limitations on freedom of religion and belief, and informal restrictions that take the form of social hostilities towards religion or towards particular religious groups, usually minorities. This Article seeks to build upon this work in three ways: first, by noting the striking correlations between countries with very high or high legal restrictions and social hostilities regarding religion and the frequent presence of a dominant religious group in those countries; second, by suggesting that dominant national religious majority groups may create an even more formidable obstacle to religious freedom than laws and regulations and other forms of social hostility towards religious groups; and third, by noting a dramatic exception to this pattern, countries where Catholics are the dominant religious group. Countries with Catholic majorities are, for the most part, places where there are not high legal or social restrictions on freedom of religion. This Article concludes by considering the role that Dignitatis Humanae may have played in this remarkable pattern of low legal restrictions and social hostilities in Catholic-majority countries.

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© 2016 Brett G. Scharffs. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.

*Brett G. Scharffs is the Francis R. Kirkham Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty and Curriculum, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, and Associate Director of the International Center for Law and Religion Studies. This Article has been jointly developed through a series of presentations with my colleague at the International Center for Law and Religion Studies, Donlu Thayer. The usual expression of gratitude is altogether insufficient to acknowledge her contribution to our collaborative thinking and work on this topic. Heartfelt thanks is also expressed to Professor Rick Garnett and the student editors of the Notre Dame Law Review, as well as the other participants in the symposium for their comments and questions.