Notre Dame Law Review

The Notre Dame Law Review is pleased to announce the launch of Notre Dame Law Review Online, an online supplement to the journal’s print volume. This addition expands the scope of the Law Review, and allows the journal to work more inclusively with Notre Dame Law School students. Publications are not limited to members of the Law Review, and the online supplement will be published three times each academic year.

The first issue of Volume 90 of the Notre Dame Law Review Online is headlined by Mitchell S. Ettinger & James C. Altman, Partner and Associate, respectively, at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, in Washington D.C. Their Practitioner Comment analyzes corporate liability under the False Claims Act for noncompliance with Most Favored Customer clauses in federal and state government contracts, and provides recommendations to companies regarding compliance with those clauses.

In her Case Comment on Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc., Krista M. Pikus draws attention to the Supreme Court’s failure to characterize Hobby Lobby as either a religious or secular organization. She offers an innovative approach to characterizing organizations as “quasi-religious,” and correspondingly affording them “quasi-rights” to act or refrain from acting on the basis of those beliefs.

Stephen M. DeGenaro and Katie Jo Baumgardner round out the first issue of Notre Dame Law Review Online with two insightful Recent Case commentaries regarding the First Amendment issues present in McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission and Lane v. Franks. Mr. DeGenaro overviews the Supreme Court’s controversial election law decision of last term in McCutcheon, in which the Court held aggregate limits on campaign contributions violated the First Amendment, and suggests the result in that case may not be as dramatic as some commentators suggest. Ms. Baumgardner recounts the Supreme Court’s holding in Lane, in which the Court afforded First Amendment protection to employee speech compelled by subpoena. She also focuses on the Court’s failure to address the scope of protection afforded such speech when it arises as part of an employee’s ordinary employment obligations.